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Introduction {#sec0005}
============

The end of an outbreak must be determined objectively ([@bib0035]). For the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa from 2014 to 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended securing 42 days ([@bib0050]), or twice the observed maximum incubation period, from the time at which the last case was found negative for the virus at second testing. Subsequently, the country without EVD cases would enter a period of heightened surveillance lasting 90 days to monitor for any other occurrence of infection.

As there have been errors in determining the end of an outbreak when adhering to the criteria mentioned above, it would be valuable to learn from the events of EVD recrudescence occurring in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. This will inform wiser decision-making in the future. The present study aimed to review all known recrudescence events in West Africa occurring during the period 2014--2016.

Materials and methods {#sec0010}
=====================

A recrudescence event was defined as the reappearance of at least one confirmed case of EVD in a country where the end of EVD had been declared in advance. The term 'recrudescence' is used, because the reappearance of EVD in West Africa has been associated with persistent activity of infection arising from already infected humans. WHO reports and other sources were reviewed in an analysis of all known recrudescence events occurring from 2014 to 2016 ([@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0025], [@bib0010], [@bib0015], [@bib0005]).

In the statistical analysis, the background mechanisms of erroneous declarations of the end of an EVD outbreak in West Africa during 2014--2016 were investigated. A survey of the demographic variables of recrudescent cases was performed (i.e., age and sex), and the most likely source of infection and the dates of illness onset and confirmation were also obtained. By examining the date of confirmation of the purported last case (i.e., the case before the recrudescent case) and the date on which the outbreak was declared to have ended, the following were calculated: (1) the time interval between successive confirmations, (2) the number of days from burial or the second negative testing result of the last case, and (3) the number of days in heightened surveillance.

Results {#sec0015}
=======

A total of five cases of recrudescence were identified ([Figure 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}): three occurred in Liberia and one each in Guinea and Sierra Leone ([@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0025], [@bib0010], [@bib0015], [@bib0005]). Two were male and three were female ([Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"}). One of the three cases in Liberia was caused by inter-country migration, and therefore may be better stated as recurrence rather than recrudescence ([@bib0055], [@bib0015]). That case was associated with viral exposure at a funeral in Guinea ([@bib0015]). Sexual transmission involving survivors was suspected for three cases ([@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0005]). Of these, one in Liberia was documented as linked to a survivor who had recovered 164 days before confirmation of the recrudescent case ([@bib0010]). Similarly, the recrudescent female case in Sierra Leone is believed to have been due to sexual transmission ([@bib0055], [@bib0005]). In Guinea, three probable unconfirmed deaths considered as consistent with EVD were observed in advance of the confirmed recrudescence on March 17, 2016 ([@bib0055], [@bib0010], [@bib0015]). Virologically, the causative virus of the recrudescence event was demonstrated to be closely related to the virus isolated previously in the same country ([@bib0010], [@bib0015]). The route of transmission in a 15-year-old male in Liberia remains unknown, but intra-household transmission during the mother's pregnancy from the immunocompromised mother to the 15-year-old boy was suspected ([@bib0055], [@bib0025]).Figure 1Time-line of events: declaration of Ebola-free status and of recrudescence in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The time at confirmation of recrudescent cases is indicated with blue diamonds; the time of illness onset is also indicated with a green diamond, if available.Figure 1Table 1Recrudescence of Ebola virus disease in West Africa, 2014--2016.Table 1CountrySource of infectionAge, yearsSexInterval between successive confirmations (days)[a](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}Days from burial or second negative testing result of last case[b](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}Days in heightened surveillanceRef.LiberiaSuspected sexual intercourse17Male101\
(Mar 20 to Jun 29, 2015)9351[@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0025], [@bib0010]LiberiaUnknown, suspected bodily fluids (of pregnant mother)15Male130\
(Jul 12 to Nov 19, 2015)11977[@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0025], [@bib0010]LiberiaMigration, bodily fluids (funeral)30Female133\
(Nov 20, 2015 to Apr 1, 2016)12078[@bib0055], [@bib0040], [@bib0025], [@bib0010], [@bib0015]GuineaSuspected sexual intercourse and under-ascertainment37Female140\
(Oct 29, 2015 to Mar 17, 2016)12179[@bib0055], [@bib0015]Sierra LeoneSuspected sexual intercourse22Female123\
(Sep 13, 2015 to Jan 14, 2016)111[c](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}68[@bib0055], [@bib0005][^1][^2][^3]

The time interval from laboratory confirmation of the perceived last case to confirmation of the recrudescent case ranged from 101 to 140 days ([Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"}). All observed intervals were longer than the mean serial interval; i.e., the time from illness onset in the primary case to that in the secondary case, estimated at 15.3 days ([@bib0045]). From the latest date of either burial or second negative test result, it took 92--122 days to confirm the cases of recrudescence -- all more than double the 42-day waiting period. Recrudescence events occurred 51--79 days after the declaration of the end of the outbreak. The time lags from declaration to recrudescence were all within the 90-day period of heightened surveillance. The three sexual transmission events involving survivors---the first two in Liberia and one in Sierra Leone---required 164 days, \>150 days, and approximately 180 days, respectively, from discharge of survivors to confirmation of the recrudescent case.

Discussion {#sec0020}
==========

The recrudescence events were not associated with the common routes of EVD transmission, such as close contact during burials or care-giving, but rather with other routes or reasons, including sexual transmission, possible immunocompromise, and migration. While use of a 42-day waiting period posed practical difficulties from 2014 to 2016, the present exercise was not intended to criticize that fixed, transparent criterion. Even with the use of a more objective approach, including serial interval distribution (e.g., as applied for Middle East respiratory syndrome in South Korea ([@bib0035])), this may not have sufficiently captured the involvement of sexual transmission and other reasons for recrudescence.

The need to consider the prevention of sexual transmission via survivors when declaring the end of an epidemic poses a dilemma. This is because the recognition of such a risk among survivors could potentially involve discrimination, and fear of stigma may lead to under-ascertainment.

The results of this study suggest that the supposed end of an EVD epidemic could be divided objectively into several different types. For instance, the restriction of movement for cases and exposed individuals---i.e., socially 'costly' interventions---could be ceased through use of a 42-day waiting period. This may not necessarily ensure a long enough waiting time for an uncommon route of infection. Meanwhile, heightened surveillance and the avoidance of risky sexual intercourse should be set at \>180 days, i.e. the observed maximum in this study, echoing a study on the transmission network ([@bib0030]); ideally this duration should be set at 9 months considering the persistence of the virus in semen ([@bib0020]). These are essential to monitor and prevent recrudescence through uncommon routes of transmission. It is intended to investigate the objective determination of the outbreak in a more explicit manner using mathematical modeling techniques.
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[^1]: Duration from confirmation of the last case to confirmation of the re-emerging case.

[^2]: Duration from burial or the second negative testing result of the last case to confirmation of the re-emerging case.

[^3]: A declaration was made on the day following the negative laboratory test and, thus, the specified date minus 42 does not equal 68 days, as in the next column to the right.
